Editorial Note - Letter
I - Letter II - Letter
III - Letter IV - Letter
V - Letter VI - Letter
VII - Letter VIII
A Sketch of the State of History of Europe, from the Pirenean Treaty
in one Thousand Six Hundred and Fifty-Nine,
to the Year One Thousand Six Hundred and Eighty-Eight.
[253] The
first observation I shall make on this third period of modern history
is, that as the ambition of Charles the Fifth, who united the whole formidable
power of Austria in himself, and the restless temper, the cruelty and
bigotry of Philip the Second, were principally objects of the attention
and solicitude of the councils of Europe, in the first of these periods;
and as the ambition of Ferdinand the Second, and the Third, who aimed
at nothing less than extirpating the protestant interest, and under that
pretence subduing the liberties of Germany, were objects of the same kind
in the second: so an opposition to the growing power of France, or to
speak more properly, to the exorbitant ambition of the house of Bourbon,
has been the principal affair of Europe, during the greatest part of the
present period. The design of aspiring to universal monarchy was imputed
to Charles the Fifth, as soon as he began to give proofs of his ambition
and capacity. The same design was imputed to Louis the Fourteenth, as
soon as he began to feel his own strength, and the weakness of his neighbors.
Neither of these princes was induced, I believe, by the flattery of his
courtiers; or the apprehension of his adversaries, to entertain so chimerical
a design as this would have been, even in that false sense wherein the
word universal
[254] is so often understood: and I mistake very
much if either of them was of a character, or in circumstances, to undertake
it. Both of them had strong desires to raise their families higher, and
to extend their dominions farther; but neither of them had that bold and
adventurous ambition which makes a conqueror and a hero. These apprehensions,
however, were given wisely, and taken usefully. They cannot be given nor
taken too soon when such powers as these arise; because when sach powers
as these are besieged as it were early, by the common policy and watchfulness
of their neighbors, each of them may in his turn of strength sally forth,
and gain a little ground; but none of them will be able to push their
conquest far, and much less to consummate the entire projects of their
ambition. Besides the occasional opposition that was given to Charles
the Fifth by our Henry the Eighth, according to the different moods of
humor he was in; by the popes, according to the several turns of their
private interest; and by the princes of Germany, according to the occasions
or pretences that religion or civil liberty furnished; he had from his
first setting out a rival and an enemy in Francis the First, who did not
maintain his cause "in forma pauperis," if I may use such an
expression: as we have seen the house of Austria sue, in our days, for
dominion at the gate of every palace in Europe. Francis the First was
the principal in his own quarrels, paid his own armies, fought his own
battles; and though his valor alone did not hinder Charles the Fifth from
subduing all Europe, as Bayle, a better philologer than politician, somewhere
asserts, but a multitude of other circumstances easily to be traced in
history; yet he contributed by his victories, and even by his defeats,
to waste the strength and check the course of that growing power. Louis
the Fourteenth had no rival of this kind in the house of Austria, nor
indeed any enemy of this importance to combat, till the prince of Orange
became king of Great Britain: and he had great advantages in many other
respects, which it is necessary to consider in order to make a true judgment
on the affairs of Europe from the year one thousand six hundred and sixty.
You will discover the first of these advantages, and such as were productive
of all the rest, in the conduct of Richelieu and of Mazarin. Richelieu
formed the great design, and laid the foundations: Mazarin pursued the
design, and raised the superstructure. If I do not deceive myself extremely,
there are few passages in history that deserve your lordships attention
more than the conduct that the first and greatest of these ministers held,
in laying the foundations I speak of. You will observe how he helped to
embroil affairs on every side, and to keep the house of Austria at bay
as it were; how he entered into the quarrels of Italy against Spain, into
that concerning the Valte-
[255] line, and that concerning the succession
of Mantua; without engaging so deep as to divert him from another great
object of his policy, subduing Rochelle and disarming the Huguenots. You
will observe how he turned himself after this was done, to stop the progress
of Ferdinand in Germanv. While Spain fomented discontents at the court
and disorders in the kingdom of France, by all possible means, even by
taking engagements with the Duke of Rohan; and for supporting the protestants;
Richelieu abetted the same interest in Germany against Ferdinand; and
in the Low Countries against Spain. The emperor was become almost the
master in Germany. Christian the Fourth, king of Denmark, had been at
the head of a league, wherein the United Provinces, Sweden, and Lower
Saxony entered, to oppose his progress: but Christian had been defeated
by Tilly and Valstein, and obliged to conclude a treaty at Lubec, where
Ferdinand gave him the law. It was then that Gustavus Adolphus, with whom
Richelieu made an alliance, entered into this war, and soon turned the
fortune of it. The French minister had not yet engaged his master openly
in the war; but when the Dutch grew impatient, and threatened to renew
their truce with Spain, unless France declared; when the king of Sweden
was killed, and the battle of Nordlingen lost; when Saxony had turned
again to the side of the emperor, and Brandenburg and so many others had
followed this example, that Hesse almost alone persisted in the Swedish
alliance: then Richelieu engaged his master, and profited of every circumstance
which the conjuncture afforded, to engage him with advantage. For, first,
he had a double advantage by engaging so late: that of coming fresh into
the quarrel against a wearied and almost exhausted enemy; and that of
yielding to the impatience of his friends, who, pressed by their necessities
and by the want they had of France, gave this minister an opportunity
of laying those claims and establishing those pretensions, in all his
treaties with Holland, Sweden and the princes and states of the empire,
on which he had projected the future aggrandisement of France. The manner
in which he engaged, and the air that he gave to his engagement, were
advantages of the second sort, advantages of reputation and credit; yet
were these of no small moment in the course of the war, and operated strongly
in favor of France as he designed they should, even after his death, and
at and after the treaties of Westphalia. He varnished ambition with the
most plausible and popular pretences. The elector of Treves had put himself
under the protection of France: and, if I remember right, he made this
step when the emperor could not protect him against the Swedes, whom he
had reason to apprehend. No matter, the governor of Luxemburg was ordered
to surprise Treves and to
[256] seize the elector. He executed his orders
with success, and carried this prince prisoner into Brabant. Richelieu
seized the lucky circumstance; he reclaimed the elector: and, on the refusal
of the cardinal infant, the war was declared. France, you see, appeared
the common friend of liberty, the defender of it in the Low Countries
against the king of Spain, and in Germany against the emperor, as well
as the protector of the princes of the empire, many of whose states had
been illegally invaded, and whose persons were no longer sale from violence
even in their own palaces. All these appearances were kept up in the negotiations
at Munster, where Mazarin reaped what Richelieu had sowed. The demands
that France made for herself were very great; but the conjuncture was
favorable, and she improved it to the utmost. No figure could be more
flattering than hers at the head of these negotiations; nor more mortifying
than the emperors through the whole course of the treaty. The princes
and states of the empire had been treated as vassals by the emperor: France
determined them to treat with him on this occasion as sovereigns, and
supported them in this determination. Whilst Sweden seemed concerned for
the protestant interest alone, and showed no other regard, as she had
no other alliance; France affected to be impartial alike to the protestant
and to the papist and to have no interest at heart but the common interest
of the Germanic body. Her demands were excessive, but they were to be
satisfied principally out of the emperors patrimonial dominions.
It had been the art of her ministers to establish this general maxim on
many particular experiences, that the grandeur of France was a real, and
would be a constant security to the rights and liberties of the empire
against the emperor: and it is no wonder therefore, this maxim prevailing,
injuries, resentments, and jealousies being fresh on one side, and services,
obligations, and confidence on the other, that the Germans were not unwilling
France should extend her empire on this side of the Rhine whilst Sweden
did the same on this side of the Baltic. These treaties, and the immense
credit and influence that France had acquired by them in the empire, put
it out of the power of one branch of the house of Austria to return the
obligations of assistance to the other, in the war that continued between
France and Spain, till the Pyrenean treaty. By this treaty the superiority
of the house of Bourbon over the house of Austria was not only completed
and confirmed but the great design of uniting the Spanish and the French
monarchies under the former was laid.
The third period therefore begins by a great change of
the balance of power in Europe, and by the prospect of one much greater
and more fatal. Before I descend into the particulars I intend to mention,
of the course of affairs, and of the political
[257] conduct of the great powers of Europe in
this third period; give me leave to cast my eyes once more back on the
second. The reflection I am going to make seems to me important, and leads
to all that is to follow.
The Dutch made their peace separately at Munster with
Spain, who acknowledged then the sovereignty and independency of their
commonwealth. The French, who had been, after our Elizabeth. their principal
support, reproached them severely for this breach of faith. They excused
themselves in the best manner, and by the best reasons, they could. All
this your lordship will find in the monuments of that time. But I think
it not improbable that they had a motive you will not find there, and
which it was not proper to give as a reason or excuse to the French..Might
not the wise men amongst them consider even then, besides the immediate
advantages that accrued by this treaty to their commonwealth, that the
imperial power was fallen; that the power of Spain was vastly reduced;
that the house of Austria was nothing more than the shadow of a great
name, and that the house of Bourbon was advancing, by large strides, to
a degree of power as exorbitant, and as formidable as that of the other
family had been in the hands of Charles the Fifth, of Philip the Second,
and lately of the two Ferdinands? Might they not foresee, even then, what
happened in the course of very few years, when they were obliged, for
their own security, to assist their old enemies the Spaniards against
their old friends the French? I think they might. Our Charles the First
was no great politician, and yet he seemed to discern that the balance
of power was turning in favor of France, some years before the treaties
of Westphalia. He refused to be neuter, and threatened to take part with
Spain, if the French pursued the design of besieging Dunkirk and Graveline,
according to a concert taken between them and the Dutch, and in pursuance
of a treaty for dividing the Spanish Low Countries, which Richelieu had
negotiated. Cromwell either did not discern this turn of the balance of
power, long afterwards when it was much more visible; or, discerning it,
he was induced by reasons of private interest to act against the general
interest of Europe. Cromwell joined with France against Spain, and though
he got Jamaica and Dunkirk, he drove the Spaniards into a necessity of
making a peace with France, that has disturbed the peace of the world
a!most fourscore years, and the consequences of which have well nigh beggared
in our times the nation he enslaved in his. There is a tradition, I have
heard it from persons who lived in those days, and I believe it came from
Thurloe, that Cromwell was in treaty with Spain, and ready to turn his
arms against France when he died. If this fact was certain, as little
as I honor his
[258] memory, I should have some regret that he
died so soon. But whatever his intentions were, we must charge the Pyrenean
treaty, and the fatal consequences of it, in great measure to his account.
The Spaniards abhorred the thought of marrying their Infanta to Louis
the Fourteenth. lt was on this point that they broke the negotiation Lionne
had begun: and your lordship will perceive, that if they resumed it afterwards,
and offered the marriage they had before rejected, Cromwells league
with France was a principal inducement to this alteration of their resolutions
The precise point at which the scales of power turn, like
that of the solstice in either tropic, is imperceptible to common observation:
and, in one case as in the other, some progress must be made in the new
direction, before the change is perceived. They who are in the sinking
scale, for in the political balance of power, unlike to all others, the
scale that is empty sinks, and that which is full rises; they who are
in the sinking scale do not easily come off from the habitual prejudices
of superior wealth, or power, or skill,or courage,nor from the confidence
that these prejudices inspire. They who are in the rising scale do not
immediately feel their strength, nor assume that confidence in it which
successful experience gives them afterwards. They who are the most concerned
to watch the variations of this balance, misjudge often in the same manner,
and from the same prejudices. They continue to dread a power no longer
able to hurt them, or they continue to have no apprehensions of a power
that grows daily more formidable. Spain verified the first observation
at the end of the second period, when, proud and poor, and enterprising
and feeble, she still thought herself a match for France. France verified
the second observation at the beginning of the third period, when the
triple alliance stopped the progress of her arms, which alliances much
more considerable were not able to effect afterwards. The other principal
powers of Europe, in their turns, have verified the third observation
in both its parts, through the whole course of this period.
When Louis the Fourteenth took the administration of affairs
into his own hands, about the year one thousand six hundred and sixty,
he was in the prime of his age, and had, what princes seldom have, the
advantages of youth and those of experience together. Their education
is generally bad; for which reason royal birth, that gives a right to
the throne among other people, gave an absolute exclusion from it among
the Mamalukes. His was, in all respects, except one, as bad as that of
other princes. He jested sometimes on his own ignorance; and there were
other defects in his character, owing to his education, which he did not
see. But Mazarin had initiated him betimes in the mysteries of his policy.
He had seen a great part of those foundations laid,
[259] on which he was to raise the fabric of his
future grandeur: and as Mazarin finished the work that Richelieu began,
he had the lessons of one, and the examples of both, to instruct him.
He had acquired habits of secrecy and method, in business; of reserve,
discretion, decency, and dignity, in behaviour. If he was not the greatest
king, he was the best actor of majesty at least, that ever filled a throne.
He by no means wanted that courage which is commonly called bravery, though
the want of it was imputed to him in the midst of his greatest triumphs:
nor that other courage, less ostentatious and more rarely found, calm,
steady, persevering resolution; which seems to arise less from the temper
of the body, and is therefore called courage of the mind. He had them
both most certainly, and I could produce unquestionable anecdotes in proof.
He was, in one word, much superior to any prince with whom he had to do,
when he began to govern. He was surrounded with great captains bred in
former wars, and with great ministers bred in the same school as himself.
They who had worked under Mazarin worked on the same plan under him; and
as they had the advantages of genius and experience over most of the ministers
of other countries, so they had another advantage over those who were
equal or superior to them: the advantage of serving a master whose absolute
power was established; and the advantage of a situation wherein they might
exert their whole capacity without contradiction; over that, for instance,
wherein your lordships great grandfather was placed, at the same
time, in England, and John de Wit in Holland. Among these ministers, Colbert
must be mentioned particularly upon this occasion; because it was he who
improved the wealth and consequently the power of France extremely, by
the order he put into the finances, and by the encouragement he gave to
trade and manufactures. The soil, the climate, the situation of France,
the ingenuity, the industry, the vivacity of her inhabitants are such;
she has so little want of the product of other countries, and other countries
have so many real or imaginary wants to be supplied by her; that when
she is not at war with all her neighbors, when her domestic quiet is preserved
and any tolerable administration of government prevails, she must grow
rich at the expense of those who trade, and even of those who do not open
a trade, with her. Her baubles, her modes, the follies and extravagances
of her luxury, cost England, about the time we are speaking of, little
less than eight hundred thousand pounds sterling a year, and other nations
in their proportions. Colbert made the most of all these advantageous
circumstances, and whilst he filled the national spunge, he taught his
successors how to squeeze it; a secret that he repented having discovered,
they say,
[260] when he saw the immense sums that were necessary
to supply the growing magnificence of his master.
This was the character of Louis the Fourteenth, and this
was the state of his kingdom at the beginning of the present period. If
his power was great his pretensions were still greater. He had renounced,
and the Infanta with his consent had renounced, all right to the succession
of Spain, in the strongest terms that the precautions of the councils
of Madrid could contrive. No matter; he consented to these renunciations,
but your lordship will find by the letters of Mazarin, and by other memorials,
that he acted on the contrary principle, from the first, which he avowed
soon afterwards. Such a power, and such pretensions, should have given,
one would think, an immediate alarm to the rest of Europe. Philip the
Fonrth was broken and decayed, like the monarchy he governed. One of his
sons died, as I remember, during the negotiations that preceded the year
one thousand six hundred and sixty: and the survivor, who was Charles
the Second, rather languished, than lived, from the cradle to the grave.
So dangerous a contingency, therefore, as the union of the two monarchies
of France and Spain, being in view forty years together; one would imagine,
that the principal powers of Europe had the means of preventing it constantly
in view during the same time. But it was otherwise. France acted very
systematically from the year one thousand six hnndred and sixty, to the
death of king Charles the Second of Spain. She never lost sight of her
great object, the succession to the whole Spanish monarchy; and she accepted
the will of the king of Spain in favor of the Duke of Anjou. As she never
lost sight of her great object during this time, so she lost no opportunity
of increasing her power, while she waited for that of succeeding in her
pretensions. The two branches of Austria were in no condition of making
a considerable opposition to her designs and attempts. Holland, who of
all other powers was the most concerned to oppose them, was at that time
under two influences that hindered her from pursuing her true interest.
Her true interest was to have used her utmost endeavors to unite closely
and intimately with England on the restoration of king Charles. She did
the very contrary. John de Wit, at the head of the Louvestein faction,
governed. The interest of his party was to keep the house of Orange down:
he courted therefore the friendship of France, and negiected that of England.
The alliance between our nation and the Dutch was renewed, I think, in
one thousand six hundred and sixty-two; but the latter had made a defensive
league with France a little before, on the supposition principally of
a war with England. The war became inevitable very soon.
[261] Cromwell had chastised them for their usurpations
in trade, and the outrages and cruelties they had committed; but he had
not cured them. The same spirit continued in the Dutch, the same resentments
in the English: and the pique of merchants became the pique of nations.
France entered into the war on the side of Holland; but the little assistance
she gave the Dutch showed plainly enough that her intention was to make
these two powers waste their strength against one another; whilst she
extended her conquests in the Spanish Low Countries. Her invasion in these
provinces obliged De Wit to change his conduct. Hitherto he had been attached
to France in the closest manner, had led his republic to serve all the
purposes of France, and had renewed with the marshal dEstrades a
project of dividing the Spanish Netherlands between France and Holland,
that had been taken up formerly, when Richelieu made use of it to flatter
their ambition, and to engage them to prolong the war against Spain. A
project not unlike to that which was held out to them by the famous preliminaries,
and the extravagant barrier-treaty, in one thousand seven hundred and
nine; and which engaved them to continue a war on the principle of ambition,
into which they had entered with more reasonable and more moderate views.
As the private interests of the two De Wits hindered that
commonwealth from being on her guard, as early as she ought to have been,
against France, so the mistaken policy of the court of England, and the
short views, and the profuse temper of the prince who governed, gave great
advantages to Louis the Fourteenth in the pursuit of his designs. He bought
Dunkirk: and your lordship knows how great a clamor was raised on that
occasion against your noble ancestor; as if he alone had been answerable
for the measure, and his interest had been concerned in it. I have heard
our late friend Mr. George Clarke quote a witness, who was quite unexceptionable,
but I cannot recall his name at present, who, many years after all these
transactions, and the death of my lord Clarendon, affirmed, that the earl
of Sandwich had owned to him, that he himself gave his opinion, among
many others, officers, and ministers, for selling Dunkirk. Their reasons
could not be good, I presume to say; but several, that might be plausible
at that time, are easily guessed. A prince like king Charles, who would
have made as many bad bargains as any young spendthrift, for money, finding
himself thus backed, we may assure ourselves, was peremptorily determined
to sell: and whatever your great grandfathers opinion was, this
I am able to pronounce upon my own experience, that his treaty for the
sale is no proof he was of opinion to sell. When the resolution of selling
was once taken, to whom could the sale be made? To the Dutch? No. This
measure would have
[262] been at least as impolitic, and, in that
moment, perhaps more odious than the other. To the Spaniards? They were
unable to buy: and, as low as their power was sunk, the principle of opposing
it still prevailed. I have sometimes thought that the Spaniards, who were
forced to make peace with Portugal, and to renounce all claim to that
crown, four or five years afterwards, might have been induced to take
this resolution then; if the regaining Dunkirk without any expense had
been a condition proposed to them; and that the Portuguese, who, notwithstanding
their alliance with England and the indirect succors that France afforded
them, were little able, after the treaty especially, to support a war
against Spain, might have been induced to pay the price of Dunkirk, for
so great an advantage as immediate peace with Spain, and the extinction
of all foreign pretences on their crown. But this speculation concerning
events so long ago passed is not much to the purpose here. I proceed therefore
to observe, that notwithstanding the sale of Dunkirk, and the secret leanings
of our court to that of France, yet England was first to take the alarm,
when Louis the Fourteenth invaded the Spanish Netherlands in one thousand
six hundred and sixty-seven: and the triple alliance was the work of an
English minister. It was time to take this alarm; for from the moment
that the king of France claimed a right to the county of Burgundy, the
duchy of Brabant, and other portions of the Low Countries that devolved
on his queen by the death of her father Philip the Fourth, he pulled off
the mask entirely. Volumes were written to establish, and to refute this
supposed right. Your lordship no doubt will look into a controversy that
has employed so many pens and so many swords; and I believe you will think
it was sufficiently bold in the French, to argue from customs, that regulated
the course of private successions in certain provinces, to a right of
succeeding to the sovereignty of those provinces: and to assert the divisibility
of the Spanish monarchy, with the same breath with which they asserted
the indivisibility of their own; although the proofs in one case were
just as good as the proofs in the other, and the fundamental law of indivisibility
was at least as good a law in Spain, as either this or the Salique law
was in France. But however proper it might be for the French and Austrian
pens to enter into long discussions, and to appeal, on this great occasion,
to the rest of Europe; the rest of Europe had a short objection to make
to the plea of France, which no sophisms, no quirks of law could evade.
Spain accepted the renunciations as a real security: France gave thern
as such to Spain, and in effect to the rest of Europe. If they had not
been thus given, and thus taken, the Spaniards would not have married
their Infanta to the king of France, whatever distress they
[263] might have endured by the prolongation of
the war. These renunciations were renunciations of all rights whatsoever
to the whole Spanish monarchy, and to every part of it. The provinces
claimed by France at this time were parts of it. To claim them, was therefore
to claim the whole; for if the renunciations were no bar to the rights
accruing to Mary Theresa on the death of her father Philip the Fourth,
neither could they be any to the rights that would accrue to her and her
children, on the death of her brother Charles the Second: an unhealthful
youth, and who at this instant was in immediate danger of dying; for to
all the complicated distempers he brought into the world with him, the
small-pox was added. Your lordship sees how the fatal contingency of uniting
the two monarchies of France and Spain stared mankind in the face; and
yet nothing, that I can remember, was done to prevent it: not so much
as a guaranty given, or a declaration made to assert the validity of these
renunciations, and for securing the effect of them. The triple alliance
indeed stopped the progress of the French arms, and produced the treaty
of Aix la Chapelle. But England, Sweden, and Holland, the contracting
powers in this alliance, seemed to look, and probably did look, no farther.
France kept a great and important part of what she had surprised or ravished,
or purchased; for we cannot say with any propriety that she conquered:
and the Spaniards were obliged to set all they saved to the account of
gain. The German branch of Austria had been reduced very low in power
and in credit under Ferdinand the Third, by the treaties of Westphalia,
as I have said already. Louis the Fourteenth maintained, during many years,
the influence these treaties had given him among the princes and states
of the empire. The famous capitulation made at Frankfort on the election
of Leopold, who succeeded Ferdinand about the year one thousand six hundred
and fifty-seven, was encouraged by the intrigues of France: and the power
of France was looked upon as the sole power that could ratify and secure
effectually the observation of the conditions then made. The league of
the Rhine was not renewed, I believe, after the year one thousand six
hundred and sixty-six; but though this league was not renewed, yet some
of these princes and states continued in their old engagements with France:
whilst others took new engagements on particular occasions, according
as private and sometimes very paltry interests, and the emissaries of
France in all their little courts, disposed them. In short, the princes
of Germany showed no alarm at the growing ambition and power of Louis
the Fourteenth, but contributed to encourage one, and to confirm the other.
In such a state of things the German branch was little able to assist
the Spanish branch against France, either
[264] in the war that ended by the Pyrenean treaty,
or in that we are speaking of here, the short war that began in one thousand
six hundred and sixty-seven, and was ended by the treaty of Aix la Chapelle
in one thousand six hundred and sixty-eight. But it was not this alone
that disabled the emperor from acting with vigor in the cause of his family
then, nor that has rendered the house of Austria a dead weight upon all
her allies ever since. Bigotry, and its inseparable companion, cruelty,
as well as the tyranny and avarice of the court of Vienna, created in
those days, and has maintained in ours, almost a perpetual diversion of
the imperial arms from all effectual oppsition to France. I mean to speak
of the troubles in Hungary. Whatever they became in their progress, they
were caused originally by the usurpations and persecutions of the emperor:
and when the Hungarians were called rebels first, they were called so
for no other reason than this, that they would not be slaves. The dominion
of the emperor being less supportable than that of the Turks, this unhappy
people opened a door to the latter to infest the empire, instead of making
their country what it had been before, a barrier against the Ottoman power.
France became a sure, though secret ally of the Turks, as well as the
Hungarians, and has found her account in it, by keeping the emperor in
perpetual alarms on that side, while she has ravaged the empire and the
Low Countries on the other. Thus we saw, thirty-two years ago, the arms
of France and Bavaria in possession of Passau, and the malcontents of
Hungary in the suburbs of Vienna. In a word, when Louis the Fourteenth
made the first essay of his power, by the war of one thousand six hundred
and sixty-seven, and sounded, as it were, the councils of Europe concerning
his pretensions on the Spanish succession, he found his power to be great
beyond what his neighbors, or even he perhaps thought it: great by the
wealth, and greater by the united spirit of his people; greater still
by the ill policy and divided interests that governed those who had a
superior common interest to oppose him. He found that the members of the
triple alliance did not see, or seeing did not think proper to own that
they saw, the injustice, and the consequence of his pretensions. They
contented themselves to give to Spain an act of guaranty for securing
the execution of the treaty of Aix la Chapelle. He knew even then how
ill the guaranty would be observed by two of them at least, by England
and by Sweden. The treaty itself was nothing more than a composition between
the bully and the bullied. Tournay, and Lisle, and Doway, and other places
that I have forgot, were yielded to him: and he restored the county of
Burgundy, according to the option that Spain made against the interest
and the expectation too of the Dutch, when an
[265] option was forced upon her. The king of Spain
compounded for his possession: but the emperor compounded at the same
time for his succession, by a private eventual treaty of partition, which
the Commander of Gremonville and the Count of Aversberg signed at Vienna.
The same Leopold, who exclaimed so loudly, in one thousand six hundred
and ninety-eight, against any partition of the Spanish monarchy, and refused
to submit to that which England and Holland had then made, made one himself
in one thousand six hundred and sixty-eight, with so little regard to
these two powers, that the whole ten provinces were thrown into the lot
of France.
There is no room to wonder if such experience as Louis
the Fourteenth had upon this occasion, and such a face of affairs in Europe,
raising his hopes, raised his ambition: and if, in making peace at Aix
la Chapelle, he meditated a new war, the war of one thousand six hundred
and seventy-two; the preparations he made for it, by negotiations in all
parts, by alliances wherever he found ingression, and by the increase
of his forces, were equally proofs of ability, industry, and power. I
shall not descend into these particulars: your lordship will find them
pretty well detailed in the memorials of that time. But one of the alliances
he made I must mention, though I mention it with the utmost regret and
indignation. England was fatally engaged to act a part in this conspiracy
against the peace and the liberty of Europe, nay, against her own peace
and her own liberty; for a bubbles part it was, equally wicked and
impolitic. Forgive the terms I use, my lord: none can be too strong. The
principles of the triple alliance, just and wise, and worthy of a king
of England, were laid aside. Then, the progress of the French arms was
to be checked, the ten provinces were to be saved, and by saving them
the barrier of Holland was to be preserved. Now, we joined our counsels
and our arms to those of France, in a project that could not be carried
on at all, as it was easy to foresee, and as the event showed, unless
it was carried on against Spain, the emperor, and most of the princes
of Germany, as well as the Dutch; and which could not be carried on successfully,
without leaving the ten provinces entirely at the mercy of France, and
giving her pretence and opportunity of ravaging the empire, and extending
her conquests on the Rhine. The medal of Van Beuninghen, and other pretences
that France took for attacking the states of the Low Countries, were ridiculous.
They imposed on no one: and the true object of Louis the Fourteenth was
manifest to all. But what could a king of England mean? Charles the Second
had reasons of resentment against the Dutch, and just ones too no doubt.
Among the rest, it was not easy for him to forget the affront he had suffered,
and
[266] the loss he had sustained, when, depending
on the peace that was ready to be signed, and that was signed in Breda
in July, he neglected to fit out his fleet; and when that of Holland,
commanded by Ruyter, with Cornelius de Wit on board as deputy or commissioner
of the states, burnt his ships at Chatham in June. The famous perpetual
edict, as it was called, but did not prove in the event, against the election
of a stadtholder, which John de Wit promoted, carried, and obliged the
Prince of Orange to swear to maintain a very few days after the conclusion
of the peace at Breda, might be another motive in the breast of king Charles
the Second: as it was certainly a pretence of revenge on the Dutch, or
at least on the De Wits and the Louvestein faction, that ruled almost
despotically in that commonwealth. But it is plain that neither these
reasons, nor others of a more ancient date, determined him to this alliance
with France; since he contracted the triple alliance within four or five
months after the two events, I have mentioned, happened. What then did
he mean? Did he mean to acquire one of the seven provinces, and divide
them, as the Dutch had twice treated for the division of the ten, with
France? I believe not; but this I believe, that his inclinations were
favorable to the popish interest in general, and that he meant to make
himself more absolute at home; that he thought it necessary to this end
to humble the Dutch, to reduce their power, and, perhaps, to change the
form of their government; to deprive his subjects of the correspondence
with a neighboring protestant and free state, and of all hope of succor
and support from thence in their opposition to him; in a word to abet
the designs of France on the continent, that France rnight abet his designs
on his own kingdom. This, I say, I believe; and this I should venture
to affirm, if I had in my hands to produce, and was at liberty to quote,
the private relations I have read formerly, drawn up by those who were
no enemies to such designs, and on the authority of those who were parties
to them. But whatever king Charles the Second meant, certain it is, that
his conduct established the superiority of France in Europe.
But this charge, however, must not be confined to him
alone. Those who were nearer the danger, those who were exposed to the
immediate attacks of France, and even those who were her rivals for the
same succession, having either assisted her, or engaged to remain neuters,
a strange fatality prevailed, and produced such a conjuncture as can hardly
be parallelled in history. Your lordship will observe with astonishment,
even in the beginning of the year one thousand six hundred and seventy-two,
all the neighbors of France, acting as if they had nothing to fear from
her, and some as if they had much to hope, by helping her
[267] to oppress the Dutch and sharing with her
the spoils of that commonwealth. "Delenda est Carthago" was
the cry in England, and seemed too a maxim on the continent.
In the course of the same year, you will observe that
all these powers took the alarm, and began to unite in opposition to France.
Even England thought it time to interpose in favor of the Dutch. The consequences
of this alarm, of this sudden turn in the policy of Europe, and of that
which happened, by the massacre of the De Wits, and the elevation of the
prince of Orange, in the government of the seven provinces, saved these
provinces, and stopped the rapid progress of the arms of France. Louis
the Fourteenth indeed surprised the seven provinces in this war, as he
had surprised the ten in that of one thousand six hundred and sixty-seven,
and ravaged defenceless countries with armies sufficient to conquer them,
if they had been prepared to resist. In the war of one thousand six hundred
and seventy-two, he had little less than one hundred and fifty thousand
men on foot, besides the bodies of English, Swiss, Italians, and Swedes,
that amounted to thirty or forty thousand more. With this mighty force
he took forty places in forty days, imposed extravagant conditions of
peace, played the monarch a little while at Utrecht; and as soon as the
Dutch recovered from their consternation, and, animated by the example
of the Prince of Orange and the hopes of succor, refused these conditions,
he went back to Versailles, and left his generals to carry on his enterprise:
which they did with so little success, that Grave and Maestricht alone
remained to him of all the boasted conquests he had made; and even these
he offered two years afterwards to restore, if by that concession he could
have prevailed on the Dutch at that time to make peace with him. But they
were not yet disposed to abandon their allies; for allies now they had.
The emperor and the king of Spain had engaged in the quarrel against France,
and many of the princes of the empire had done the same. Not all. The
Bavarian continued obstinate in his neutrality, and, to mention no more,
the Swedes made a great diversion in favor of France in the empire; where
the Duke of Hanover abetted their designs as much as he could, for he
was a zealous partisan of France, though the other princes of his house
acted for the common cause. I descend into no more particulars. The war
that Louis the Fourteenth kindled by attacking in so violent a manner
the Dutch commonwealth, and by making so arbitrary an use of his first
success, became general, in the Low Countries, in Spain, in Sicily on
the upper and lower Rhine, in Denmark, in Sweden, and in the provinces
of Germany belonging to these two crowns; on the Mediterranean, the Ocean,
and the Baltic. France supported this war with advantage on every side:
and when your
[268] lordship considers in what manner it was
carried on against her, you will not be surprised that she did so. Spain
had spirit, but too little strength to maintain her power in Sicily, where
Messina had revolted; to defend her frontier on that side of the Pyrenées;
and to resist the great efforts of the French in the Low Countries. The
empire was divided; and, even among the princes who acted against France,
there was neither union in their councils, nor concert in their projects,
nor order in preparations, nor vigor in execution: and, to say the truth,
there was not, in the whole confedracy, a man whose abilities could make
him a match for the Prince of Condé or the Marshal of Turenne; nor many
who were in any degree equal to Luxemburg, Crequi, Schomberg, and other
generals of inferior note, who commanded the armies of France. The emperor
took this very time to make new invasions on the liberties of Hungary,
and to oppress his protestant subjects. The Prince of Orange alone acted
with invincible firmness, like a patriot, and a hero. Neither the seductions
of France nor those of England, neither the temptations of ambition nor
those of private interest, could make him swerve from the true interest
of his country, nor from the common interest of Europe. He had raised
more sieges, and lost more battles, it was said, than any general of his
age had done. Be it so. But his defeats were manifestly due in a great
measure to circumstances independent on him: and that spirit, which even
these defeats could not depress, was all his own. He had difficulties
in his own commonwealth; the governors of the Spanish Low Countries crossed
his measure sometimes; the German allies disappointed and broke them often:
and it is not improbable that he was frequently betrayed. He was so perhaps
even by Souches, the imperial general; a Frenchman according to Bayle,
and a pensioner of Louvois according to common report, and very strong
appearances, He had not yet credit and authority sufficient to make him
a centre of union to a whole confederacy, the soul that animated and directed
so great a body. He came to be such afterwards; but at the time spoken
of, he could not take so great a part upon him. No other prince or general
was equal to it: and the consequences of this defect appeared almost in
every operation. France was surrounded by a multitude of enemies, all
intent to demolish her power. But, like the builders of Babel, they spoke
different languages: and as those could not build, these could not demolish,
for want of understanding one another. France improved this advantage
by her arms, and more by her negotiations. Nimeguen was, after Cologne,
the scene of these. England was the mediating power, and I know not whether
our Charles the Second did not serve her purposes more usefully in the
latter, and under the
[269] character of mediator, than he did or could
have done by joining his arms to hers, and acting as her ally. The Dutch
were induced to sign a treaty with him, that broke the confederacy, and
gave great advantage to France: for the purport of it was to oblige France
and Spain to make peace on a plan to be proposed to them, and no mention
was made in it of the other allies that I remember. The Dutch were glad
to get out of an expensive war. France promised to restore Maestricht
to them, and Maestricht was the only place that remained unrecovered of
all they had lost. They dropped Spain at Nimeguen, as they had dropped
France at Munster; but many circumstances concurred to give a much worse
grace to their abandoning of Spain, than to their abandoning of France.
I need not specify them. This only I would observe: when they made a separate
peace at Munster, they left an ally who was in condition to carry on the
war alone with advantage, and they presumed to impose no terms upon him:
when they made a separate peace at Nimeguen, they abandoned an ally who
was in no condition to carry on the war alone, and who was reduced to
accept whatever terms the common enemy prescribed. In their great distress
in one thousand six hundred and seventy-three, they engaged to restore
Maestricht to the Spaniards as soon as it should be retaken: it was not
retaken, and they accepted it for themselves as the price of the separate
peace they made with France. The Dutch had engaged farther, to make neither
peace nor truce with the king of France, till that prince consented to
restore to Spain all he had conquered since the Pyrenean treaty. But far
from keeping this promise in any tolerable degree, Louis the Fourteenth
acquired, by the plan imposed on Spain at Nimeguen, besides the county
of Burgundy, so many other countries and towns on the side of the ten
Spanish provinces, that these, added to the places he kept of those which
had been yielded to him by the treaty of Aix la Chapelle (for some of
little consequence he restored) put into his hands the principal strength
of that barrier, against which we goaded ourselves almost to death in
the last great war; and made good the saying of the Marshal of Schomberg,
that to attack this barrier was to take the beast by his horns. I know
very well what may be said to excuse the Dutch. The emperor was more intent
to tyrannise his subjects on one side, than to defend them on the other.
He attempted little against France, and the little he did attempt was
ill-ordered, and worse executed. The assistance of the princes of Germany
was often uncertain, and always expensive. Spain was already indebted
to Holland for great sums; greater still must be advanced to her if the
war continued: and experience showed that France was able, and would continue,
to prevail against her present
[270] enemies. The triple league had stopped her
progress, and obliged her to abandon the county of Burgundy; but Sweden
was now engaged in the war on the side of France, as England had been
in the beginning of it: and England was now privately favorable to her
interests, as Sweden had been in the beginning of it. The whole ten provinces
would have been subdued in the course of a few campaigns more: and it
was better for Spain and the Dutch too, that part should be saved by accepting
a sort of composition, than the whole be risked by refusing it. This might
be alleged to excuse the conduct of the States General, in imposing hard
terms on Spain; in making none for their other allies; and in signing
alone: by which steps they gave France an opportunity that she improved
with great dexterity of management, the opportunity of treating with the
confederates one by one, and of beating them by detail in the cabinet,
if I may so say, as she had often done in the field. I shall not compare
these reasons, which were but too well founded in fact, and must appear
plausible at least, with other considerations that might be, and were
at the time, insisted upon. I confine myself to a few observations, which
every knowing and impartial man must admit. Your lordship will observe,
first, that the fatal principle of compounding with Louis the Fourteenth,
from the time that his pretensions, his power, and the use he made of
it, began to threaten Europe, prevailed still more at Nimeguen than it
had prevailed at Aix: so that although he did not obtain to the full all
he attempted, yet the dominions of France were by common consent, on every
treaty, more and more extended; her barriers on all sides were more and
more strengthened; those of her neighbors were more and more weakened;
and that power, which was to assert one day, against the rest of Europe,
the pretended rights of the house of Bourbon to the Spanish monarchy,
was more and more established, and rendered truly formidable in such hands
at least, during the course of the first eighteen years of the period.
Your lordship will please to observe, in the second place, that the extreme
weakness of one branch of Austria, and the miserable conduct of both;
the poverty of some of the princes of the empire, and the disunion, and
to speak plainly, the mercenary policy of all of them; in short, the confined
views, the false notions, and, to speak as plainly of my own as of other
nations, the iniquity of the councils of England, not only hindered the
growth of this power from being stopped in time, but nursed it up into
strength almost insuperable by any future confederacy. A third observation
is this: If the excuses made for the conduct of the Dutch at Nimeguen
are not sufficient, they too must come in for their share in this condemnation,
even after the death of the De Wits; as they were to be condemned most
[271] justly, during the administration, for abetting
and favoring France. If these excuses, grounded on their inability to
pursue any longer a war, the principal profit of which was to accrue to
their confederates, for that was the case after the year one thousand
six hundred and seventy-three, or one thousand six hundred and seventy-four,
and the principal burden of which was thrown on them by their confederates;
if these are sufficient, they should not have acted, for decencys
sake as well as out of good policy, the part they did act in one thousand
seven hundred and eleven, and one thousand seven hundred and twelve, towards
the late queen, who had complaints of the same kind, in a much higher
degree and with circumstances much more aggravating, to make of them,
of the emperor, and of all the princes of Germany; and who was far from
treating them and their other allies, at that time, as they treated Spain
and their other allies in one thousand six hundred and seventy-eight.
Immediately after the Dutch had made their peace, that of Spain was signed
with France. The emperors treaty with this crown and that of Sweden
was concluded in the following year: and Louis the Fourteenth being now
at liberty to assist his ally, whilst he had tied up the powers with whom
he had treated from assisting theirs, he soon forced the king of Denmark
and the elector of Brandenburg to restore all they had taken from the
Swedes, and to conclude the peace of the north. In all these treaties
he gave the law, and he was now at the highest point of his grandeur.
He continued at this point for several years, and in this height of his
power he prepared those alliances against it, under the weight of which
he was at last well nigh oppressed; and might have been reduced as low
as the general interest of Europe required, if some of the causes, which
worked now, had not continued to work in his favor, and if his enemies
had not proved, in their turn of fortune, as insatiable as prosperity
had rendered him.
After he had made peace with all the powers with whom
he had been in war, he continued to vex both Spain and the empire, and
to extend his conquests in the Low Countries, and on the Rhine, both by
the pen and the sword. He erected the chambers of Metz and of Brisach,
where his own subjects were prosecutors, witnesses, and judges all at
once. Upon the decisions of these tribunals, he seized into his own hands,
under the notion of dependencies and the pretence of reunions, whatever
towns or districts of country tempted his ambition, or suited his conveniency:
and added, by these and by other means, in the midst of peace, more territories
to those the late treaties had yielded to him, than he could have got
by continuing the war. He acted afterwards, in the support of all this,
without any bounds or
[272] limits. His glory was a reason for attaching
Holland in one thousand six hundred and seventy-two, and his conveniency
a reason for many of the attacks he made on others afterwards. He took
Luxemburg by force; he stole Strasbourg; he bought Casal: and, whilst
he waited the opportunity of acquiring to his family the crown of Spain,
he was not without thoughts, nor hopes perhaps, of bringing into it the
imperial crown likewise. Some of the cruelties he exercised in the empire
may be ascribed to his disappointment in this view: I say some of them,
because in the war that ended by the treaty of Nimeguen, he had already
exercised many. Though the French writers endeavor to slide over them,
to palliate them, and to impute them particularly to the English that
were in their service; for even this one of their writers has the front
to advance: yet these cruelties, unheard of among civilised nations, must
be granted to have been ordered by the counsels, and executed by the arms
of France, in the Palatinate, and in other parts.
If Louis the Fourteenth could have contented himself with
the acquisitions that were confirmed to him by the treaties of one thousand
six hundred and seventy-eight, and one thousand six hundred and seventy-nine,
and with the authority and reputation which he then gained; it is plain
that he would have prevented the alliances that were afterwards formed
against him, and that he might have regained his credit amongst the princes
of the empire, where he had one family alliance by the marriage of his
brother to the daughter of the elector Palatine, and another by that of
his son to the sister of the elector of Bavaria; where Sweden was
closely attached to him, and where the same principles of private interest
would have soon attached others as closely. He might have remained not
only the principal, but the directing power of Europe, and have held this
rank with all the glory imaginable, till the death of the king of Spain,
or some other object of great ambition, had determined him to act another
part. But instead of this, he continued to vex and provoke all those who
were, unhappily for them, his neighbors, and, that in many instances,
for trifles. An example of this kind occurs to me. On the death of the
Duke of Deux Ponts, he seized that little inconsiderable duchy, without
any regard to the indisputable right of the king of Sweden, to the services
that crown had rendered him, or to the want he might have of that alliance
hereafter. The consequence was, that Sweden entered with the emperor,
the king of Spain, the elector of Bavaria, and the States General, into
the alliance of guaranty, as it was called, about the year one thousand
six hundred and eighty-three, and into the famous league of Augsburg,
in one thousand six hundred and eighty-six.
[273] Since I have mentioned this league, and since
we may date from it a more general, and more concerted opposition to France,
than there had been before; give me leave to recall some of the reflections
that have presented themselves to my mind, in considering what I have
read, and what I have heard related, concerning the passages of that time.
They will be of use to form our judgment concerning later passages. If
the king of France became an object of aversion on account of any invasions
he made, any deviations from public faith, any barbarities exercised where
his arms prevailed, or the persecution of his protestant subjects; the
emperor deserved to be such an object, at least as much as he, on the
same accounts. The emperor was so too, but with this difference relatively
to the political system of the west: the Austrian ambition and bigotry
exerted themselves in distant countries, whose interests were not considered
as a part of this system; for otherwise there would have been as much
reason for assisting the people of Hungary and of Transylvania against
the emperor, as there had been formerly for assisting the people of the
seven united provinces against Spain, or as there had been lately for
assisting them against France; but the ambition and bigotry of Louis the
Fourteenth were exerted in the Low Countries, on the Rhine, in Italy,
and in Spain, in the very midst of this system, if I may say so, and with
success that could not fail to subvert it in time. The power of the house
of Austria, that had been feared too long, was feared no longer: and that
of the house of Bourbon, by having been feared too late, was now grown
terrible. The emperor was so intent on the establishment of his absolute
power in Hungary, that he exposed the empire doubly to desolation and
ruin for the sake of it. He left the frontier almost quite defenceless
on the side of the Rhine, against the inroads and ravages of France: and
by showing no mercy to the Hungarians, nor keeping any faith with them,
he forced that miserable people into alliances with the Turks, who invaded
the empire, and besieged Vienna. Even this event had no effect upon him.
Your lordship will find, that Sobieski, king of Poland, who had forced
the Turks to raise the siege, and had fixed the imperial crown that tottered
on his head, could not prevent on him to take those measures by which
alone it was possible to cover the empire, to secure the king of Spain,
and to reduce that power who was probably one day to dispute with him
this princes succession. Tekeli and the malcontents made such demands
as none but a tyrant could refuse, the preservation of their ancient privileges,
liberty of conscience, the convocation of a free diet or parliament, and
others of less importance. All was in vain. The war continued with them,
and with the Turks, and France was left at liberty to push her enterprise,
[274] almost without opposition, against Germany
and the Low Countries. The distress in both was so great, that the States
General saw no other expedient for stopping the progress of the French
arms, than a cessation of hostilities, or a truce of twenty years; which
they negotiated, and which was accepted by the emperor and the king of
Spain, on the terms that Louis the Fourteenth thought fit to offer. By
these terms he was to remain in full and quiet possession of all he had
acquired since the years one thousand six hundred and seventy-eight, and
one thousand six hundred and seventy-nine; among which acquisitions that
of Luxemburg and that of Strasbourg were comprehended. The conditions
of this truce were so advantageous to France, that all her intrigues were
employed to obtain a definitive treaty of peace upon the same conditions.
But this was neither the interest nor the intention of the other contracting
powers. The imperial arms had been very successful against the Turks.
This success, as well as the troubles that followed upon it in the Ottoman
armies, and at the Porte, gave reasonable expectation of concluding a
peace on that side: and, this peace concluded, the emperor, and the empire,
and the king of Spain would have been in a much better posture to treat
with France. With these views, that were wise and just, the league of
Augsburg was made between the emperor, the kings of Spain and Sweden as
princes of the empire, and the other circles and princes. This league
was purely defensive. An express article declared it to be so: and as
it had no other regard, it was not only conformable to the laws and constitutions
of the empire, and to the practice of all nations, but even to the terms
of the act of truce so lately concluded. This pretence, therefore, for
breaking the truce, seizing the electorate of Cologne, invading the Palatinate,
besieging Philipsburg, and carrying unexpected and undeclared war into
the empire could not be supported: nor is it possible to read the reasons
published by France at this time, and drawn from her fears of the imperial
power, without laughter. As little pretence was there to complain, that
the emperor refused to convert at once the truce into a definitive treaty;
since if he had done so, he would have confirmed in a lump, and without
any discussion, all the arbitrary decrees of those chambers, or courts,
that France had erected to cover her usurpation; and would have given
up almost a sixth part of the provinces of the empire, that France one
way or other had possessed herself of. The pretensions of the Duchess
of Orleans on the succession of her father, and her brother, which were
disputed by the then elector Palatine, and were to be determined by the
laws and customs of the empire, afforded as little pretence for beginning
this war, as any of the former allegations. The exclusion of the
[275] Cardinal of Furstenburg, who had been elected
to the archbishopric of Cologne, was capable of being aggravated: but
even in this case his most Christian majesty opposed his judgment and
his authority against the judgment and authority of that holy father,
whose eldest son he was proud to be called. In short, the true reason
why Louis the Fourteenth began that cruel war with the empire two years
after he had concluded a cessation of hostilities for twenty, was this:
he resolved to keep what he had got; and, therefore, he resolved to encourage
the Turks to continue the war. He did this effectually, by invading Germany
at the very instant when the Sultan was suing for peace. Notwithstanding
this, the Turks were in treaty again the following year: and good policy
should have obliged the emperor, since he could not hope to carry on this
war and that against France, at the same time, with vigor and effect,
to conclude a peace with the least dangerous enemy of the two. The decision
of his disputes with France could not be deferred, his designs against
the Hungarians were in part accomplished, for his son was declared king,
and the settlement of that crown in his family was made; and the rest
of these, as well as those that he formed against the Turks, might be
deferred. But the councils of Vienna judged differently, and insisted
even at this critical moment on the most exorbitant terms; on some of
such a nature, that the Turks showed more humanity and a better sense
of religion in refusing, than they in asking them. Thus the war went on
in Hungary, and proved a constant diversion in favor of France, during
the whole course of that which Louis the Fourteenth began at this time;
for the treaty of Carlowitz was posterior to that of Ryswick. The empire,
Spain, England, and Holland engaged in the war with France: and on them
the emperor left the burden of it. In the short war of one thousand six
hundred and sixty-seven, he was not so much as a party, and instead of
assisting the king of Spain, which it must be owned, he was in no good
condition of doing, he bargained for dividing that princes succession,
as I have observed above. In the war of one thousand six hundred and seventy
two he made some feeble efforts. In this of one thousand six hundred and
eighty-eight he did still less: and in the war which broke out at the
beginning of the present century he did nothing, at least after the first
campaign in Italy, and after the engagements that England and Holland
took by the grand alliance. In a word, from the time that an opposition
to France became a common cause in Europe, the house of Austria has been
a clog upon it in many instances, and of considerable assistance to it
in none. The accession of England to this cause, which was brought about
by the revolution of one thousand six hundred and eighty eight, might
have made amends, and more than amends, one
[276] would think, for this defect, and have thrown
superiority of power and of success on the side of the confederates, with
whom she took part against France. This, I say, might be imagined, without
over-rating the power of England, or undervaluing that of France; and
it was imagined at that time. How it proved otherwise in the event; how
France came triumphant out of the war that ended by the treaty of Ryswick,
and though she gave up a great deal, yet preserved the greatest and the
best part of her conquests and acquisitions made since the treaties of
Westphalia, and the Pyrenees; how she acquired, by the gift of Spain,
that whole monarchy for one of her princes, though she had no reason to
expect the least part of it without a war at one time, nor the great lot
of it even by a war at any time; in short, how she wound up advantageously
the ambitious system she had been fifty years in weaving; how she concluded
a war, in which she was defeated on every side, and wholly exhausted,
with little diminution of the provinces and barriers acquired to France,
and with the quiet possession of Spain and the Indies to a prince of the
house of Bourbon: all this, my lord, will be the subject of your researches,
when you come down to the latter part of the last period of modern history.
Editorial Note - Letter
I - Letter II - Letter
III - Letter IV - Letter
V - Letter VI - Letter
VII - Letter VIII
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